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A WELFARE ANALYSIS OF PRODUCTION AND
CONSUMPTION OF BROADBEANS IN EGYPT

Adel M. Moustafa
B. Delworth Gardner
Dyaa K. Abdou

Abstract
This paper describes the production, marketing, and trade
policies for broadbeans in Egypt and quantifies the welfare

losses associated with these policies.

Beans are heavily

subsidized and rationed to consumers, and until very recently
producers have been required to deliver quotas of part of their
production to the government at prices that have been below world
market levels.

These inefficient policies have required that

Egypt import increasing quantities of beans through time in order
to satisfy consumer demand.

A free market for beans has

developed in rural areas, however, and this market has reduced
both demand-side and supply-side welfare losses.

A WELFARE ANALYSIS OF PRODUCTION AND
CONSUMPTION OF BROADBEANS IN EGYPT
Introduction
The broadbean is both heavily subsidized and rationed in Egypt, and
is the basic staple for breakfast for most Egyptians in both rural and
urban areas.

Prices to domestic bean producers for mandated quotas are

fixed by government decree.

Because of this distorted pricing policy

the government has had to import large quantities of beans in recent
years to balance supply and demand.

Thus, the government budget is

affected by the subsidy to consumers, fixed producer prices, and
imports.

Therefore, virtually every Egyptian is touched in some way by

policies relating to this commodity.
This paper aims to describe and explain the production, marketing,
and trade policies associated with broadbeans (hereafter referred to
simply as beans) and to conceptualize and quantify the basic efficiency
and equity impacts of these policies.
It is well to emphasize that beans are representative of a number
of food commodities that are subsidized and rationed in Egypt.
sugar, cooking oils, and lentils are other examples.

Rice,

The methods

utilized here to gauge the welfare impacts of governmental policies
could be used also for these commodities.
The cultivated area in beans was about 237,731 feddans in 1981 (see
Table 1), the lowest figure in the preceding decade.
roughly one acre.)

(A feddan is

Production also reached a decade low in 1982,

because of lower yields as well as the smaller area planted.
columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 1).

By importing to cover the

(See
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demand-supply gap, government budgetary resources had to be converted
into foreign exchange that was needed for the international
transactions.

This impact on the budget could be mitigated if outlays

to producers were reduced on the mandatory delivery of the bean quota.
Indeed, this is precisely what the government did by setting producer
prices below the border price for imports before 1982.

In 1982,

however, the mandatory quota imposed on producers was eliminated
altogether.

Of course, compared to a situation where producer and

consumer prices would have been established in free and open markets,
the policies just described have discriminated against producers and
have benefitted consumers to the extent that they could obtain
subsidized supplies.

The point must not be lost, however, that even

consumers have sacrificed consumer's surplus when excess demand could
not be eliminated by importation.
This brief summary picture can be completed by pointing out that a
free market for beans exists, principally in rural areas where beans are
produced.

Since production generally exceeded the quota requirement

before 1982, producing families had supplies that could be used for home
consumption or could be traded on the open market.
This paper is composed of four additional sections.

The first

describes in the greater detail the quota and marketing system for this
commodity in Egypt.
issues.

The second focuses on demand and consumption

The third discusses the distribution system, how prices are

determined, and the subsidy question.

The fourth section presents a

welfare anaysis of Egypt's pricing, trade, and quota policy for beans.
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Some policy implications of the results are presented in a concluding
section.
The Quota and Marketing System
The existing marketing system was initiated in June, 1975.

Bean

prices were escalating rapidly, and the government elected to embark on
a rationing program whereby fixed quantities of beans would be allocated
to consumers by the Ministry of Supply at subsidized prices.
On the supply side, before 1982 bean producers were obligated to
deliver a specified amount of their production, called the quota, to
government collection centers.

The quota varied from one governorate to

another depending on factors affecting yield, such as soil fertility and
water availability.

Fines were imposed on producers who did not deliver

the required quota.

The General Authority of Supplied Commdities then

took the beans and distributed them to the official distribution outlets
of the various governorates.
The quota in each governorate had to be integrated with the land
allotment system which sets cropping patterns and thus determines the
area devoted to bean production.

Land allotments to each crop vary by

governorate and are administratively determined by the Ministry of
Agriculture (MOA) through its offices in the governorates.
As suggested earlier, pressure on the government budget from the

subsidy and rationing system is probably the root cause for the quota
and land allotment policy for beans (and other crops); and thus from the
point of view of the government, the system might appear to be fully
justified.

From the viewpoint of the farmer, however, it is apparent

4

that these regulations produce results that are inimical to an efficient
allocation of resources and reduce his net income.

It is not only a

question of the different goals of the farmers and the government.

If

the regulations are inefficient in allocating resources there is a
social cost that must be borne ultimately by consumers as well.

The

national income will be less than it might have been and standards of
living on average will be reduced.
The land allotment scheme that dictates the area that each producer
must plant to the various crops, effectively removes the
cropping-pattern decision from the producer and gives it to the
government.

This is likely to be inefficient, since only the producer

has the incentive to collect and analyze the information on relative
costs and prices of various crops and apportion acreage to those crops
that will maximize his well-being.

This matter is especially critical

in costing out the factors owned by the farmer and his family.
Goverment personnel could not possibly know the specific opportunity
costs of land, water, the operator's management, family labor, etc.,
that are unique to each farm and which are needed to determine optimal
cropping patterns.
If the farmer violates the land allotment regulation he must face
the high probability of paying a fine which could be costly for him.
One piece of evidence that indicates that the land allotment scheme is
indeed inefficient is the fact that there are many reported cases of
producers ignoring the acreage restrictions and paying the fine.
would suggest that the profits captured by ignoring the acreage
requirement are at least as high as the fine.

This
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The economic effects of a mandatory quota imposed on producers are
somewhat complex.
why.

Some simplifying assumptions will enable us to see

Assume that all bean markets in Egypt are interconnected and

supplies are free to move to markets where they bring highest net
returns to the sellers (not a completely valid assumption since trade
barriers exist that prevent produce movement from one governorate to
another).

Further, let us assume that all bean markets have equal

demand price elasticities.

Then a quota system, which has the effect

of reducing beans going to rural free markets and increases the supply
to urban consumers, will increase the free market price in rural areas
but decrease it in whatever free markets might exist in urban areas.
Consumers in rural areas would be worse off and those in urban areas
would be better off than if the quota system did not exist.

Further,

if the quota price paid to producers is below the free market price in
rural areas, and beans are rationed to consumers at subsidized prices,
there is a transfer of wealth from bean producers to bean consumers.

We

will discuss this point further below.
In addition, risk may be an important element in the decision of
whether or not to deliver the quota or simply trade in the free market.
The quota price is usually known in advance of the growing season,
whereas the free market price is not.

There may be considerable price

fluctations through time in the free market, and a highly risk averse
seller may require a premium over the quota price on average to induce
him to bear these price risks.

Unfortunately, since we have little or

no information about risk preferences, these matters will receive little
attention in this paper.
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Bean Consumption in Egypt
In both urban and rural areas beans have historically been the most
important source of protein in the diet for most people.

The average

annual per capita utilization was 5.98 kg over the period 1971-79.
consumption has been declining in recent years, however.

Bean

In 1972-73

annual per capita consumption was 7.8 kg, but by 1979 it had fallen to
4.9 kg.
The Family Budget Survey of 1974-75, sponsored and published by the
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, has been analyzed
by Ismail, Gardner, and Abdou (1982).

The data in Table 2 corroborate

that beans are consumed by all income classes in both urban and rural
areas.

Granulated beans (usually prepared as a porridge or fried as a

beancake) are identified separately from nongranulated beans (usually
boiled).

The data do not include expenditures for ready-to-eat beans

and beancake, which are prepared and sold in shops outside the home, so
the consumption picture is incomplete.
The data in Table 2 imply that nongranulated beans were a superior
good in both urban and rural areas, since expenditures rose as income
increased.

Granulated beans, on the other hand, appeared to be superior

in rural areas but were inferior in urban areas.
Data from the Family Budget Survey were also utilized to estimate
the distribution of consumption across 13 income classes.

The sampled

data were recorded in physical units; i.e., per capita consumption in
kilos.

Gini coefficients were calculated.

A Gini value of zero would

imply equal consumption across income classes, whereas values
approaching 1 would imply high degrees of concentration in consumption.
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The Gini values for nongranulated beans were 0.09 for urban areas and
0.17 for rural areas.

The corresponding values for granulated beans

were 0.06 for urban areas and 0.09 for rural areas, respectively.

All

these coefficients are relatively low, implying relative equality of
consumption across income classes.
As

pointed out above, in recent years Egypt has imported

significant quantities of beans:

in 1977, 23,000 tons; in 1978,

32,000 tons; in 1979, 26,000 tons; in 1980, 37,000 tons; and in 1981,
92,000 tons.

The principal suppliers have been Holland, Poland, the

United Kingdom, Ethiopia, Canada, and Morroco.

Average import prices

were far above prices paid to domestic producers on quota deliveries in
these years.

(See Table 3, columns 2 and 5.)

Ismail, Abdou, and Gardner (1982) attempted to account for the
final disposition of food commodities purchased by Egyptian families in
urban and rural areas.

Of the total quantity of beans available to the

rural family in the sampled area, an average of about 28 percent of the
beans was fed to animals or was wasted (unaccounted for), the largest
fraction for any commodity.
9 percent.

In urban areas the corresponding figure was

Beans are often included as a concentrate in a feed mix for

animals, especially poultry.

Also, they are quite susceptible to damage

from weavil, in which case they may be deemed unfit for human
consumption and are fed to animals.
The Distribution System, Pricing, and Subsidies
The government abandoned the mandatory quota system after 1980-81
and relied on voluntary delivery by the producers.

Because of the
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disparity between free market and government prices, however, the
delivery of beans to the government collection centers was only about
40,000 tons in 1980-81.
delivered.

One wonders why even this much was

Along lines argued earlier, one reason may be that some

farmers are highly risk averse and prefer a firm government price than
taking their chances in the more uncertain free market.

Also, it is

possible that free markets either may not exist everywhere or access to
some farmers may be sufficiently costly so that government centers would
be the more profitable marketing alternative.
Let us now review the disposition of beans for the year 1980-81.
The government needed about 203,000 tons to meet the consumption
requirements of the official distribution system and allocations to the
security forces.

Thus, approximately 163,000 tons must have been

imported to fill the gap between these requirements and the domestic
supply (40,000 tons) delivered to the government.
The Ministry of Supply is responsible for the distribution of the
available supply to the governorates.

In recent years, the ration book

usually gave each family an entitlement of about one kilo per month,
although precise amounts depended on quantities available.

To describe

this situation where rationed quantities vary, the term "semi-rationed"
is used.

Since there are approximately 8 million ration books in

use, the average annual requirements of the rationing system have been
about 96,000 tons.

The price of the rationed beans is fixed at

10 piasters {abbreviated as p.t.) per kilo or L.E. 100 per ton.

If

additional quantities are available (about 22,000 tons were in 1980-81)
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each holder of a ration book may purchase a pro-rata share at 15 p.t.
per kilo.

These beans are generally in granulated form.

About 18,000 tons were allocated to the security forces.

This

leaves about 67,000 tons in government hands to be distributed to the
governorates where they are sold in private retail shops, restaurants,
and government cooperatives at a price of 35 p.t. per kilo.

Many of

these beans are sold unrationed in the form of cooked beans and bean
cakes (or sandwiches, as they are called).
Domestic production was estimated at 207,788 tons in 1980-81 (see
Table 1).

After delivery to the government of 40,000 tons is

subtracted, this leaves 167,788 tons to be either consumed at home by
the producer family or traded in the open market.

It is known that free

market prices vary among governorates, but no systematic study has been
made of these markets or prices in these markets.

There are unofficial

reports, however, that the price for raw beans was approximately 50 p.t.
per kilo in the open market in 1980-81.
The quota price per ton was L.E. 58 in 1971, L.E. 105 in 1977, and
L.E. 235 in 1981.

(See Table 3.)

Despite the fact that these nominal

prices of beans received by producers have been increasing, it is
doubtful if they have increased much in real terms, since they are
shifted through time by a cost-of-production index.
Table 3 also contains some wholesale and retail prices for whole
beans.

Wholesale prices appear to represent the cost to the Ministry of

Supply of procuring beans from the farmers (the quota price) plus the
costs of transportation, storage, and handling as the beans are moved to
the final consumer.

The retail price is an average of prices paid by
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consumers.

The margin between wholesale and retail prices is higher

than that between quota and wholesale prices.
Using a cost-of-production index to change producers prices through
time will not be conducive to achieving economic efficiency.
Demand-side factors are ignored completely.

If tastes and preferences

or incomes shift to increase consumer marginal valuations of a commodity
such as beans, a free market would initially give a signal in the form
of an increase in the relative price.

Ceteris paribus, the

profitability of growing beans relative to other crops would increase
and the supply of beans would be expected to rise, providing farmers
were free to alter input commitments to alternative crops.

If relative

costs did not change, equilibrium might be re-established at the old
price, but at a higher level of output.
with efficient resource allocation.

All of this would be consistent

If consumer valuations are excluded

from the price-making process, and only cost-of-production, supply-side
factors are utilized, signals to producers would be incomplete and
resources would not be shifted to efficient employments.
Use of cost-of-production indices for pricing of quota beans may be
inefficient for other reasons as well.

Costs are categorized as fixed

and variable, and many estimation problems exist in selecting a value to
represent these costs.

For example, one of these fixed costs, land

rent, is officially established by the Land Reform Law at seven times
the land tax.

Actual rents paid may be much more since enforcement of

the law is costly and often lax.

The result is an understatement of

true costs by the index which uses the official rent.

Producers also

believe some variable costs, such as labor and machinery, are also
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understated in the index since actual costs are often higher than costs
based on "official" prices.

The upshot is that quota prices based on

understated costs of production do not increase so fast as actual costs
do.

The obvious result is to discriminate against producers who deliver

quota, since prices are not even as high as the law intended that they
should be.
Fortunately, from the point of view of allocative efficiency, the
bulk of the bean production in Egypt is not guided significantly by the
prices paid for quota.

Since most of the production is consumed at home

or is sold in the free market, where prices are established by both
supply and demand forces, it can be assumed that most producers will
look to the free market for price signals to guide production decisions.
In free competitive markets, prices represent the marginal values of
trading consumers and the marginal supply costs of trading producers.
Thus, if producers and consumers are guided in their decisions by
competitive prices, the resulting resource allocations are likely to be
efficient.
Let us now consider the matter of the subsidy to consumers, the
difference between government costs and what consumers pay.

As

was

pointed out above, in 1980-81 retail prices were L.E. 100 per ton for
rationed beans, about L.E. 150 per ton for granulated beans purchased at
government shops as available, about L.E. 350 per ton for beans going to
restaurants, shops, hotels, etc., and approximately L.E. 500 in the free
market.

Given this complex pricing system what is the subsidy, if any,

given to bean consumers?
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The Ministry of Supply has estimated that the average subsidy
received by consumers of imported beans was L.E. 219 per ton in 1980-81,
while the subsidy on domestic beans procurred through the quota was
estimated at L.E. 67 per ton.

The reason for this substantial

difference is the higher procurement and handling costs of imported
beans.

The Ministry has calculated the weighted average subsidy of the

two at L.E. 189, which makes sense given the larger quantities of
imported beans handled by the government.
This estimate fails to take into account an important
consideration, however.

The Egyptian government overvalued the Egyptian

pound throughout the 1970's by fixing the exchange rate below the
"shadow" or free market rate.

In 1980-81, the official rate was 1.E •• 7

per U.S. dollar, whereas the shadow rate ranged from about .7 to .86 per
dollar (Glassburner 1982).

Official government-to-government

international transactions are usually conducted at the official rate of
exchange.

Private trader transactions, however, are usually carried out

in dollar denominations and dollars must be obtained in the foreign
exchange market at the free shadow price.

If all bean imports had been

purchased at the shadow price, the dollar costs would have been
substantially higher than the official costs suggest and the subsidy to
consumers would be higher than indicated previously.
The Analytical Model and Estimates of Welfare Efficiency Losses
We have argued above that the policy of fixing domestic producer
prices for quota deliveries and pegging consumer prices below world
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border levels reduces real incomes of Egyptian bean producers and
increases those of Egyptian bean consumers compared to free market
outcomes.

These are the primary distributive consequences of the

current policy.

But what are the implications of this policy for

efficient resource allocation in the economy as a whole?
The conceptual apparatus for the welfare analysis appears in
Figure 1.

Sd is the domestic supply curve for beans that represents the

marginal opportunity costs of supplying beans to the economy by domestic
producers.

Dis the demand curve that stands for the marginal

valuations of Egyptian consumers for various quantities of imported and
domestically-produced beans that are consumed.

Pp is the government

fixed price offered to domestic producers for the delivery of quota
(approximately L.E. 235 per ton in 1980-81).
imports.

Pw is the border price of

To obtain the L.E. price, the cif dollar prices paid to

foreign suppliers in 1980-81 were averaged, weighted by the quantities
procurred, and converted to Egyptian pounds at both the official
exchange rate of L.E •• 7 per dollar and the shadow rate of L.E •• 855 per
dollar that prevailed in 1980-81.

These caluclated prices were L.E. 303

and L.E. 371, respectively.
As explained earlier, domestic production not delivered under the
quota was either consumed at home by the farm family or was sold on the
open market.

Pf represents the open-market price in 1980-81.

Although

systematically collected data are not available, scattered observations
would indicate that a typical price was approximately L.E. 500 in
1980-81.
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Qd in Figure 1 is the quantity domestically produced (in 1980-81

about 208,000 tons).

Qt is the total quantity available for consumption

and includes domestic production and imports (imports were about 163,000
tons in 1980-81, making Qt 375,000 tons).

Qp and Qe will be explained

later.
Considering both imports and domestic supply, the minimum-cost
supply curve to the economy is abc in Figure 1, consisting of domestic
supply so long as domestic marginal costs are lower than border import
price, and thereafter the border price.

We assume that world market

prices are unaffected by the activities of Egyptian traders which
implies that the import supply curve facing Egypt is perfectly elastic.
This assumption may not be valid if the world market for beans is thin
relative to Egyptian international demand, which would imply some
monopsony power.

If Egypt had to pay higher prices for incremental

quantities, the segment be would slope upward.

We have no evidence that

such is the case.
The existence of an open market where prices are relatively free to
seek an equilibrium level where demand equals supply is critical for
estimating marginal consumer valuations.

If Pf is the domestic free

market price and the market is in equilibrium, it must mean that at the
margin consumers value beans at Pf, otherwise there would be unsatisfied
demand and the price would be bid up, or alternatively, markets would
not clear of existing supplies and the price would fall.

If producers

receive Pf in the open market it must mean that at the margin they value
home consumption at Pf, assuming trading costs are zero.

Otherwise,

they would offer more or less for sale rather than consuming it.
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Conceptually, policy may misallocate resources by creating price
distortions that cause consumers and producers to make inefficient
allocative decisions.

For example, if domestic producers are paid less

than the world price for beans and the government imports at the world
price, then at the margin the costs of domestic production can be
expected to be less than the costs of importation, implying fewer
resources are devoted to domestic production than would be at the
efficient level.

Let us call these producer effects supply-side welfare

losses.
On the other hand, the government may restrict imports to the point
where consumers may pay more for beans at the margin than the world
market price.

This wedge implies that the marginal valuations of

consumers are higher than the costs to the economy of procurring beans
in the world market, again implying inefficiency.
of misallocation "demand-side" welfare losses.

Let us call this type

We will now proceed to

estimate these demand-side and supply-side welfare costs of existing
import and pricing policies.
Demand-side Welfare Losses
The total domestic consumption (Qt) was 371,000 tons in 1980-81.
We assume that the demand curve for beans passes through some point at
the quantity of 371,000 tons.

But what is the height of the demand

curve at this quantity; i.e., what is the marginal valuation of
consumers for this quantity?

If marginal purchases occur in the open

market for beans at a price of L.E. 500 per ton, it can be reasonably
assumed that the marginal valuation is at least this much.
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(Inframarginal quantities would be worth more if the demand curve is
downward sloping.)

This assumption allows us to establish a point on

the demand curve at (Pf, Qt) in Figure 1.

The marginal valuation by

consumers of L.E. 500 at this quantity is higher than the border price
of L.E. 303, calculated at the official exchange rate, or L.E. 371,
calculated at the shadow rate.

Consumers are foregoing consumer's

surplus by the failure of the government to import beans to the point
where the marginal valuation is equal to the border price (Pw, Qe) in
Figure 1.

If a linear demand curve is assumed, the welfare loss is

one-half (Pf - Pw) times (Qe - Qt), shown as area 1.

This loss can be

computed if Qe can be estimated, since the other variables needed for
the calculation are known.
One way of estimating Qe is to use an elasticity of demand, Ed, to
extrapolate the demand curve downward to quantity Qe•

This quantity can

be solved for 1 by using the formula for arc elasticity.
Suppose Ed is assumed to be -0.10, and the values for Qt, Pf, and
Pw are as indicated above.

Solving the arc elasticity formula for Qe

yields 390,000 tons that would have been demanded if the price had been
the border price of L.E. 303, and 382,000 tons if the border price had
been L.E. 371.

Substituting Qe into the welfare loss equation yields an

estimate of foregone consumer's surplus of L.E. 1,871,000 at the
official foreign exchange rate of L.E •• 70 per dollar and L.E. 720,000
at the shadow rate of L.E •• 855 per dollar.
Table 4 contains estimates of consumer's surplus foregone at
assumed elasticities of demand of -0.10, -0.22, -0.50, and -0.75.
data are presented this way for two reasons:

The

(1) elasticities of demand
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for beans have not been estimated econometrically and we did not have
the data to do so, and (2) we wanted to see how sensitive the
demand-side welfare losses are to the magnitude of the elasticity
estimates.

As elasticity rises in absolute terms, the quantity response

to price reductions increases and consumer's surplus foregone enlarges.
This is clearly evident in Table 4.
It is also evident from Table 4 that the demand-side welfare loss
is sensitive to the foreign exchange rate utilized in converting the
dollar border price into Egyptian pounds.

(The numbers in parentheses

in Table 4 are the welfare losses calculated at the shadow exchange
rate.)

The effect of using the higher shadow exchange rate is to raise

the border price, Pw, and make the difference smaller between the border
price and the price received by farmers in the domestic open market, Pf•
Of course, this reduces the consumer's surplus foregone.
On the matter of the choice of an exchange rate to use in such a
calculation, we would opt for the shadow rate rather than the official
rate on theoretical grounds.

As an approximation to a free market rate,

it represents better the real opportunity costs of using scarce foreign
exchange to make international purchases.
On the matter of a choice of a demand price elasticity coefficient,
given that lentils and other pulses appear to be substitutes for beans
over some range, it would appear that a price elasticity for beans of
-0.10, or even -0.22, may be too low for Egypt.

On the other hand,

given the importance of beans in the diet, especially as a breakfast
food, it may well be that a price elasticity of -0.75 is too high.
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Thus, we would speculate that -0.50 is probably the most likely correct
of those considered.
Supply-side Welfare Losses
As postulated in economic theory, producers in perfectly
competitive product markets are assumed to push production levels of a
given crop to the point where the marginal opportunity cost of
production equals the expected product price.
the farmer faces various prices for his output.

A question arises when
For example, the farmer

growing beans in Egypt in 1980-81 could receive a price of approximately
L.E. 235 per ton on quota delivered to the government and it appears
substantially more from his sales in the open market.

Which price

guided his production decision and determined the level of output?

It

seems to us that the expected free market price is a better reflection
of what the farmer might expect to receive from his production at the
margin, although clearly the quota price will also affect his total
income and ability to acquire purchased inputs.

The open market price

is a free price, however, and thus is affected by all the factors that
influence demand and supply functions.
complication.

This point raises another

Since the farmer cannot possibly foresee accurately all

these factors when making planting and production decisions, he probably
perceives the free market price as a stochastic variable.

If the farmer

is risk averse, he will require a risk premium on the price received in
the free market.

Given information available to us for this study,

however, this premium could not be estimated empirically.

If every

farmer delivered quota as well as sold on the free market, it might be
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inferred that at the margin the risk premium might be as much as the
difference.

That is, that farmer would be indifferent at the margin

between selling at the riskless quota price and the higher but risky
free market price.

We have no way of knowing whether or not farmers

sold in both outlets.

The most we can say, therefore, is that for

planning production the free market price should be considered as an
upper-limit estimate of nonrisky marginal returns.
Let us assume that the farmer is unconstrained in his purchase of
inputs that he deems profitable to utilize; i.e., he expects marginal
benefits of employing inputs to be equal to the input price.

In product

space, he will expand output to the point where the marginal opportunity
cost equals the product price.

Let us assume initially that the

observed 1980-81 price of beans in the open market was the expected
price guiding farmer decisions.

It follows that in Figure 1 the farmers

would have expected to produce Qd quantity of beans.

If we assume that

actual production was equal to expected production, we know this
observed output to be about 208,000 metric tons.

This reasoning allows

us to establish a point on the supply curve.
It is clear from Figure 1, however, that so long as the open market
price is higher than the border price, more resources will be utilized
per unit to produce beans domestically than would have been expended at
the margin to import them and thus resources are wasted.

This

conclusion assumes that government transport and handling costs are the
same whether the beans are imported or are purchased by the government
from domestic producers.
assumption is not valid.

We have no reason for believing that this
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Conceptually, the supply-side misallocation resulting from import
restriction is the excess domestic cost above the minimum-cost supply
curve abc (area 2 in Figure 1).

If the supply curve is linear, this

welfare loss can be estimated as one-half (Qd - Qp) times (Pf - Pw)•
Since we know precisely that Qd and Pw were in 1980-81, to solve for the
supply-side welfare loss we need to know Qp and Pf•
Qp is the domestic production that would have been forthcoming had
the border price been the price received by domestic producers.

Qp can

be estimated if the average price elasticity of supply is known over the
arc between points (Pw, Qp) and (Pf, Qd) in Figure 1.

Since we do not

have reliable estimates of the elasticity of supply for growing beans in
Egypt, nor the data for estimating them, we simply assumed elasticities
of 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 and calculated corresponding Qp's and associated
welfare losses.

These supply-side losses appear in Table 4.

Given that the government attempts to control cropping patterns,
our guess is that a supply price elasticity of 0.75 may be too high even
in the long-run.

It is well-known, however, that farmers often opt to

violate the cropping pattern restrictions and pay the fine imposed for
doing so.

Since this is not a costless response, however, it is

difficult to know exactly what this implies for selecting a valid price
elasticity of supply for beans.
Similar data problems exist in estimating Pf, the price received by
farmers in the open market.

It was earlier pointed out that consumers

were observed to pay an open market price of L.E. 500 per ton.

The

producer price, however, might be considerably lower, due to various
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market imperfections.

It appeared prudent to assume producer prices at

several levels, L.E. 500, L.E. 400, and the quota price of L.E. 235 per
ton.
At the quota price of L.E. 235, the misallocation welfare loss is
represented as area 3 in Figure 1.

Resources would have been wasted by

importing beans at higher costs than would have been expended at the
margin by domestic producers.
We must be clear that if producers receive less than L.E. 500 per
ton on the open market, then our estimates of the marginal value of home
consumption at this level assumed in the demand-side analysis will be
too high.
Results and Policy Implications
At a price elasticity of demand of -0.50, the demand-side welfare
losses were nearly 4 million pounds in 1980-81 if imports are valued at
the shadow exchange rate, and over 10 million if imports are valued at
the official rate.

At the assumed price elasticity of supply of 0.50,

the supply-side welfare losses are less, although under the assumptions
of a producer price at the quota level and valuing imports at the shadow
rate, the welfare loss was over 3.5 million pounds.

One of the reasons

for the larger demand-side losses is that the quantity numbers are
higher, since they include both domestic production and imports, whereas
the supply-side losses are calculated only on the domestic supply.
To put these welfare efficiency losses into perspective, let us
assume an elasticity of demand at -0.50 , and elasticity of supply at
0.50, the free market price to producers at L.E. 400 per ton, and the
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shadow foreign exchange rate.
assumptions.

These appear to us to be the most valid

The demand-side losses in 1980-81 were L.E. 3.82 million

and the supply-side losses only L.E. ,111 million.

The total of

L.E. 3.938 million is approximately 9 p.t. per capita per year for the
entire Egyptian population.
welfare loss.

This does not strike us as a terribly large

The loss would have been larger if:

(1) the free market

price to consumers had been more than L.E. 500 per ton, (2) imports had
been valued at the official exchange rate, and (3) producers had
received more than L.E. 400 per ton in the free market.

Of course,

the loss would have been even lower under the assumptions utilized if
the government had permitted more imports.
Of considerable significance is the existence of the free market in
mitigating welfare losses, on the demand side by permitting consumers to
have a larger quantity of beans supplied domestically on which they
capture consumer's surplus, and on the supply side by permitting farmers
to sell produced beans at higher prices than they would have been worth
in home consumption.
We believe these results have the following policy implications:
(1) If there is evidence that bean producers receive only the
government quota price for free market sales, the quota price should
be raised in order to reduce supply-side welfare losses.

On equity

grounds they should probably be raised anyway, since producer incomes
are almost certainly below the national average.

If prices were raised

to the international level, computed at the shadow rate of exchange,
economically efficient signals would be given to bean producers.
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(2) If domestic open market prices persist at higher levels than
border prices valued at the shadow exchange rate, the government should
remove import restrictions from private traders, or increase importation
itself.

Increasing the rationed entitlement, or semi-rationed

quantities at the 15 p.t. per kilo price, would shift demand downward in
the open market until the open market price coincided with the border
price, thus eliminating demand-side efficiency losses.

We would not

necessarily recommend this policy, however, even though it might be
economically efficient, since it would confer wealth gains on consumers
of subsidized beans.

As a general rule, the Egyptian economy would work

far more efficiently if subsidies could be eliminated, not increased.
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Footnote
1 rf the average price elasticity over the relevant arc of the
demand curve is Ed, the formula for arc elasticity is
(Qt - Qe)
(Qt+
Qe)
Ed=--~--~(Pf - Pw)
(Pf+ Pw)
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Table 1.

Area Cultivated, Total Production,
and Yields, Beans, Egypt, 1971-1981.

Year

Area
(Feddans)

Total
Production
(Tons)

Average
Yield
(Per Feddan)

1971

261.408

256.226

.980

1972

336.646

360.834

1.072

1973

270.016

272.649

1.010

1974

234.635

234.130

.961

1975

245.574

233.735

.952

1976

259.638

254.482

.980

977

291. 790

269.697

.924

1978

238.954

231.223

.968

1979

249.509

235.801

.945

1980

244.746

212.672

.869

1981

237.731

207.788

.874
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Table 2.

Annual Per Capita Expenditures for Beans by Income Class in
Urban and Rural Areas of Egypt, 1974-75*
Urban Area
Income Class, L.E.
0(200 200-800 Over 800
L.E.

Rural Area
Income Class, L.E.
0(200 200-800 Over 800

L.E.

L.E.

L.E.

Granulated beans

2.46

2.08

1.96

1.40

1.51

2.38

Nongranulated
beans

1.79

2.06

3.01

2.07

2.69

5.57

*Data taken from Family Budget Survey, 1974-75, published by the Central
Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, Cairo. (Ismail,
Gardner, and Abdou, 1982).
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Table 3.

Producer, Wholesale, Retail, and Import Prices for Beans,
Egypt, 1971-1981
Wholesale
Price
(L.E./ton)

Retail
Price
(L.E./ton)

Average
Import
Price
(L.E./ton)

Year

Quota
Price
(L.E./ton)

1971

57.55

1972

54.65

47.1

84

1973

53.87

66.0

81

1974

86.01

92.4

110

1975

104.14

113.7

138

1976

104.97

116 .3

149

1977

105.36

123.1

153

256

1978

134.52

147.2

189

283

1979

137.43

221

361

1980

199.11

1981

234.72

110

434
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Table 4.

Supply-side and Demand-side Welfare
Costs for Beans, Egypt, 1980-81
Demand-side Welfare Loss
(in L.E.)

Ed
-.10
(

1,871,000
720,000)*

-.22

3,447,000
(1,612,000)

-.so

10,244,000
(3,827,000)

-.75

16,449,500
(5,982,000)

Supply-side Welfare Loss
(in L.E.)
Free Market Price to Farmers
L.E. 500

L.E. 400

L.E. 235

Es
2,364,000
958,000)

(

697,000
56,000)

476,000
(1,681,000)

4,432,000
(1,850,000)

(

1,309,000
111,000)

952,000
(3,575,000)

6,402,000
(2,682,000)

(

1,891,000
165,000)

1,462,000
(5,724,000)

.2s
(

.so
.75

*Number

in parentheses represent welfare losses
calculated under the assumption that the world
price in pounds is valued at the shadow exchange
rate rather than at the official rate.

30

Figure 1.

Resource Misallocation Costs for Beans

